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As the ﬁnal votes are counted, pundits and pollsters sit stunned as Donald J. Trump gets set to
enter the White House. For anyone in Britain, there is a sharp tang of déjà vu in the air: this
feels like the morning after the Brexit vote all over again. Eric Kaufmann explains that, as with
Brexit, there’s little evidence that the vote had much to do with personal economic
circumstances.
For months, commentators have ﬂocked to diagnose the ills that have supposedly propelled
Trump’s support, from the Republican primaries until now. As in Britain, many have settled on a
‘left behind’ narrative – that it is the poor white working-class losers from globalization that have put Trump over
the top. Only a few clairvoyants – Michael Lind, Jonathan Haidt – have seen through the stereotypes.
But, as in Britain, there’s precious little evidence this vote had much to do with personal economic
circumstances. Let’s look at Trump voting among white Americans from a Birkbeck College/Policy
Exchange/YouGov survey I commissioned in late August. Look at the horizontal axis running along the bottom of
ﬁgure 1. In the graph I have controlled for age, education and gender, with errors clustered on states. The
average white American support for Trump on a 0-10 scale in the survey is 4.29.
You can see the two Trump support lines are higher among those at the highest end of the income scale (4) than
the lowest (1). This is not, however, statistically signiﬁcant. What is signiﬁcant is the gap between the red and
blue lines. A full two points in Trump support around a mean of 4.29. This huge spread reﬂects the diﬀerence
between two groups of people giving diﬀerent answers to a highly innocuous question: ‘Is it more important for a
child to be considerate or well-mannered?’ The answers sound almost identical, but social psychologists know
that ‘considerate’ taps other-directed emotions while ‘well-mannered’ is about respect for authority.
People’s answer to this question matters for Trump support because it taps into a cultural worldview sometimes
known as Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). Rather than RWA, which is a loaded term, I would prefer to
characterise this as the diﬀerence between those who prefer order and those who seek novelty. Social
psychologist Karen Stenner presciently wrote that diversity and diﬀerence tends to alarm right-wing
authoritarians, who seek order and stability. This, and not class, is what cuts the electoral pie in many western
countries these days. Income and material circumstances, as a recent review of research on immigration
attitudes suggests, is not especially important for understanding right-wing populism.
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Now look at the same graph in ﬁgure 2 with exactly the same questions and controls, ﬁelded on the same day, in
Britain. The only diﬀerence is that we are substituting people’s reported Brexit vote for Trump support. This time
the income slope runs the other way, with poorer White British respondents more likely to be Brexiteers than the
wealthy. But income is, once again, not statistically signiﬁcant. What counts is the same chasm between people
who answered that it was important for children to be well-mannered or considerate. In the case of Brexit vote
among White Britons, this represents a 25-point diﬀerence around a mean of 45.8 per cent (the survey
undersamples Brexiteers but this does not aﬀect this kind of analysis). When it comes to Brexit or Trump, think
successful plumber, not starving artist or temporary lecturer.
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Some might say that even though these populist voters aren’t poor, they really, actually, surely, naturally, are
concerned about their economic welfare. Well, let’s take a look at the top concerns of Trump voters in ﬁgure 3.
I’ve plotted the issues where there are the biggest diﬀerences between Trump supporters and detractors on the
left-hand side. We can start with inequality. Is this REALLY the driving force behind the Trump vote – all that talk
about unemployment, opioid addiction and suicide? Hardly. Nearly 40 per cent of those who gave Trump 0 out of
10 (blue bar) said inequality was the #1 issue facing America. Among folks rating the Donald 10 out of 10, only 4
per cent agreed. That’s a tenfold diﬀerence. Now look at immigration: top issue for 25 per cent of white Trump
backers but hardly even registering among Trump detractors. Compared to immigration, even the gap between
those concerned about terrorism, around 2:1, is not very striking.
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For Brexit vote, shown in ﬁgure 4, the story is much the same, with a few wrinkles. The gap on immigration and
inequality is enormous. The one diﬀerence is on ‘the economy in general,’ which Trump supporters worry about
more than Brexiteers. This could be because in the graph above I am comparing extreme Trump backers with
extreme detractors whereas the Brexit-Bremain numbers include all voters. Still, what jumps out is how much
more important immigration is for populist voters than inequality.
Figure 4.
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Why is Trump, Brexit, Höfer, Le Pen and Wilders happening now? Immigration and ethnic change. This is
unsettling that portion of the white electorate that prefers cultural order over change.
The US was about 90 percent white in 1960, is 63 percent white today and over half of American babies are now
from ethnic minorities. Most white Americans already think they are in the minority, and many are beginning to
vote in a more ethnopolitical way. The last time the share of foreign born in America reached current levels,
immigration restrictionist sentiment was oﬀ the charts and the Ku Klux Klan had 6 million members – mainly in
northern states concerned about Catholic immigration.
Ethnic change can happen nationally or locally, and it matters in both Britain and America. Figure 5, which
includes a series of demographic and area controls, looks at the rate of Latino increase in a white American
survey respondent’s ZIP code (average population around 30,000 in this data). The share of white Americans
rating Trump 10 out of 10 rises from just over 25 percent in locales with no ethnic change to almost 70 percent in
places with a 30-point increase in Latino population.
The town of Arcadia in Wisconsin – ﬁttingly a state that has ﬂipped to Trump – proﬁled in a recent Wall Street
Journal article, shows what can happen. Thomas Vicino has chronicled the phenomenon in other towns, such as
Farmer’s Branch, Texas or Carpentersville, Illinois. There are very few ZIP codes that have seen change on this
scale, hence the small sample and wide error bars toward the right. Still, this conﬁrms what virtually all the
academic research shows: rapid ethnic change leads to an increase in anti-immigration sentiment and populism,
even if this subsequently fades. The news also spreads and can shape the wider climate of public opinion, even
in places untouched by immigration.
Figure 5.
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Now let’s look in ﬁgure 6 at Brexit, and how White British voters in wards with fast East European growth in the
2000s voted. With similar controls, it’s the same story: when we control for the level of minorities in a ward, local
ethnic change is linked with a much higher rate of Brexit voting. From under 40 percent in places with no ethnic
change to over 60 percent voting Brexit in the fastest changing areas. Think Boston in Lincolnshire, which had
the strongest Brexit vote in the country and where the share of East Europeans jumped from essentially zero in
2001 to the highest in the country by 2011.
Figure 6.
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The Trump and Brexit votes are the opening shots which deﬁne a new political era in which the values divide
between voters – especially among whites – is the main axis of politics. In a period of rapid ethnic change, this
cleavage separates those who prefer cultural continuity and order from novelty-seekers open to diversity.
Policymakers and pundits should face this instead of imagining that old remedies – schools, hospitals, jobs – will
put the populist genie back in the bottle.
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